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MILITARY LAW-NON-VIOLENT MUTINY-CONCERT
OF INTENT AND CONCERT OF ACTION
EQUALLY ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
On October 11, 1968, Richard Bunch and three other prisoners at the
Presidio Stockade were sent out on a shotgun work detail.' After twice
asking the guard what would happen if he ran away, each time getting a
vague response, Bunch broke from the group, turning back momentarily
to give the guard "the finger." The other prisoners began to laugh, but, to
their horror, they were cut short by the report of the guard's shotgun;
Bunch was dead. No warning had been given.
The prisoners in the stockade were terribly shaken by the death of
Bunch. The next day, some of the prisoners, not including all of the de-
fendents, caused a disturbance, smashing windows and throwing tooth
powder cans. That afternoon, the prisoners, frought with rumor and dazed
with incredulous fear, showed up at formation wearing black armbands,
which were ripped off by the Provost Sergeant. At the end of this forma-
tion, the prisoners asked the stockade commander, Captain Lamont, if
they could hold a memorial service, and permission was given.
The memorial service was held the next day, and the prisoners called
it a joke. The officers sat in front, laughing, and the chaplain who con-
ducted the service intimated that the shooting was justifiable. This upset
the prisoners even more. On Sunday night, the prisoners met and dis-
cussed their many grievances: prejudice by the guards, complaints about
food, shotgun details, harassment, denial of constitutional rights, the right
to petition grievances, confinement without charge, sanitary and medical
deficiencies-especially overcrowding 2-and correction of violation of
army regulations. The result was a decision to sit down on the lawn and de-
mand to see the commanders of the stockade and post, and present their
grievances.
On Monday morning, October 14, 1968, a work-call formation was
held outside the main stockade building. As the first name was called, a
1. A shotgun detail is one in which prisoners are assigned work outside the
stockade area and are guarded by one soldier armed with a shotgun. Brief for
Appellant at 17, United States v. Rowland, - C.M.R. - (ACMR 30 June 1970)
(CM 421750).
2. Standard capacity of the stockade was eighty-eight. At the time of the al-
leged mutiny it was one-hundred forty. Id. at 13.
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group of twenty-eights prisoners walked over and sat on the grass in front
of the building. They sang and chanted freedom songs, and asked to
see the commanding officers, a lawyer, and the press.
Captain Lamont arrived shortly thereafter, apprised himself of the situa-
tion, and called in military police support, fire trucks, and a photographer.
A company of military police soon arrived, armed with pistols and night-
sticks, and these were joined by the fire trucks and the photographer. Cap-
tain Lamont had Captain Morris position himself on the opposite side of
the group to insure proof that the defendants could hear any order which
was given. Captain Lamont then attempted to read the mutiny article,
but was interrupted by prisoner Pawlowski, who read a list of grievances.
The Captain tried to drown him out, but was in turn drowned out by the
shouting prisoners.
Captain Morris was unable to hear the order, and thereafter Captain
Lamont went outside the stockade. Using a loudspeaker mounted in a
military police vehicle, he again read the mutiny article, followed by a
direct order to get up and go inside the building. This time Captain Mor-
ris was able to hear the order, but the men kept on singing.
Immediately after the order was given, military police moved in and be-
gan to carry the prisoners to the building. No resistance was offered by
the group, and several of them walked into the building on their own after
being tapped on the shoulder by the policemen. The demonstration had
lasted less than an hour.
All of the protesters were subsequently charged with mutiny. However,
many improvements were made in stockade conditions, and the prisoner
population was reduced within a short time after the incident. 4
Twenty-seven participants in the incident were tried by general court-
martial convened by Headquarters, Sixth United States Army." All of the
3. Twenty-four of those tried appealed. One prisoner left the group because
he feared getting wet when the fire trucks appeared. Id. at 23.
4. Id. The Appellant's Brief in Rowland contains a more detailed fact situa-
tion than any of the opinions in the Presidio cases.
5. The mutiny incident came to the Court of Military review in seven cases:
United States v. Rowland, supra note 1; United States v. Dodd, - C.M.R. -
(ACMR 29 June 1970) (CM 421117); United States v. Murphy, - C.M.R. -
(ACMR 26 June 1970) (CM 421558); United States v. Colip, - C.M.R. - (ACMR
17 June 1970) (CM 420896); United States v. Osczepinski, - C.M.R. - (ACMR
17 June 1970) (CM 420444); United States v. Sood, - C.M.R. - (ACMR 16
June 1970) (CM 420276); and United States v. Sales, - C.M.R. - (ACMR 22
May 1970) (CM 421750). Sales was tried along with Rowland but was severed on
appeal to settle the question of sanity. He was found not mentally responsible for
the offense.
As a parenthetical remark, the issue of sanity was raised as to all defendants, but
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accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of mutiny, but a finding of
guilty was entered against all defendants.6 The accused were sentenced
to dishonorable discharges, forfeitures of pay and allowances, and terms
of confinement at hard labor. The convening authority reduced the sen-
tence of one prisoner by reinstating pay, 7 and the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Army, invoking his statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. § 874
(1964), also reduced some sentences by shortening the period of confine-
ment.8  The cases came to the Court of Military Review on automatic
appellate review under Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice (here-
inafter referred to as U.C.M.J.), 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964). The Court of
Military Review examined the record of the court-martial and reversed as
to mutiny in all cases.9  United States v. Sood -.........-C.M.R --------- (ACMR
16 June 1970) (CM 420276).
United States v. Sood takes into consideration the elements of the
non-violent mutiny and defines them in the first truly non-violent factual
situation presented to the military courts.10 This case note win be directed
to the purpose of lending an understanding of the criminal offense of mu-
tiny, with specific attention to non-violent mutiny and its requisite intent.
In order to understand the recent developments in the law of mutiny
fully, it is necessary to explain the elements of the offense, with reference
to there historical development. The basic elements of mutiny are three:
1.) the intent to usurp or override lawful military authority; 2.) the violent
act or disturbance; or 3.) the non-violent occurrence." Intent must al-
ways be present with one or both of the latter two elements.
found only in Sales. The Brief for Appellant in Rowland points out that of the
thirteen defendants tried in that case, only one had finished high school, and all were
suffering from mental disorders. Almost all had come from broken homes, and
most were high school drop-outs. They truly were a sad lot of people. Several
attempted suicide after the court-martial, one successfully. Brief for Appellant,
supra note 1, at 3-13, 16.
For a rather biased analysis see GARDNER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT (1970). For
a critique of that volume see Spak, Book Review, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 640 (1970).
6. Defendant Seals was acquitted of the mutiny charge but found guilty of the
lesser included offense of willful disobedience in violation of UNIFORM CODE OF MIL-
ITARY JusTicE art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1964). United States v. Rowland, supra
note 1.
7. United States v. Sood, supra note 5.
8. United States v. Sood, supra note 5; United States v. Osczepinski, supra
note 5; United States v. Dodd, supra note 5; and United States v. Colip, supra note 5.
9. United States v. Rowland, supra note 1; United States v. Dodd, supra note 5;
United States v. Murphy, supra note 5; United States v. Colip, supra note 5; United
States v. Osczepinski, supra note 5; United States v. Sood, supra note 5; United
States v. Sales, supra note 5.
10. United States v. Sood, supra note 5.
11. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
1971]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Although most people, tainted by an overdose of late-late television
movies, think of mutiny as an act committed by avarice-crazed pirates
or desperate sailors, mutiny has long been proscribed as a criminal offense
for forces on land.1 2 As far back as the days of the Crusades, there was
written law forbidding mutiny.' 3 In his Articles of War of 1385, King
Richard II forbade mutiny, and set the punishment for this offense as the
loss of the best horse, if committed by mounted troops, and if committed
by foot soldiers, the loss of the left ear.1 4 It is obvious from this that riding
was safer. Articles fourteen and fifteen of the Prince Rupert Code of 1673
forbade mutiny, and authorized the death penalty, or any other penalty
which a general court-maritial might authorize for the commission of the
offense.', The Prince Rupert Code was reiterated in the Articles of War of
James II in 1688. Once again, the rules for governing the King's Army for-
bade mutiny and authorized the death penalty.' 6 Undoubtedly prompted by
fear of counter-movements to the Glorious Revolution, the first statutory
act relating solely to mutiny was enacted in 1689.17 The act provided au-
thorization for the death penalty upon conviction of mutiny, but only upon
the vote of nine out of thirteen members of the court.' 8 The less-than-
unanimous verdict requirement may have stemmed from fear of loyalties
to the deposed Catholic King, since the mutiny articles included such things
as disrespect to the Crown.' 9 For many years thereafter, the mutiny laws
were renewed on an almost annual basis. At the time of the Revolutionary
War, the British mutiny law was contained in section II of the Articles of
War.2 0  Included in this section were the offenses of traitorous words
against the King and disrespect toward officers. These were punishable
by such penalties as a court-martial might decide. Also under the
scope of this section were mutiny, failure to supress mutiny, and striking a
superior officer. The penalty for these latter three included death. 2 '
Having been raised as British subjects, and in many instances having
served in British armies, the American colonists were versed in the laws
governing the English military. Thus, when the first colonial armies were
organized, and were in need of rules to govern the conduct of troops, they
12. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 905 (2d ed. 1920).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. DAVIS, MILITARY LAW 570 (3d ed. 1915).
16. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 921.
17. British Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 W. & M. c.5; WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 929.
18. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 929.
19. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 929.
20. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 932.
21. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 932.
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logically adopted the familiar British articles, with necessary modifica-
tions. 22 Additions to the American Articles of War were made in Novem-
ber of 1775,23 and were then repealed on September 30, 1776.24 Further
modifications were made on April 4, 1777,25 May 31, 1786,26 and again
on September 29, 1789.27 In 1806, Congress reenacted the Articles as
statute law. 28 The Articles of War for the Army were again changed in
late 187329 and finally in 1920. 30 The 1920 Articles remained in effect, as
amended, until the enactment of the U.C.M.J. in 1950.
3 1
Article 94(a)(1) of the U.C.M.J. is the current mutiny article.3 2 It is a
major change from prior mutiny law in that it defines the crime specifi-
cally. Article 94(a)(1) states:
Any person subject to this code who with intent to usurp or override military au-
thority refuses, in concert with any other person or persons, to obey orders or other-
wise do his duty or creates any violence or distrubance is guilty of mutiny. .... .3
This represents a major change over prior mutiny laws, which rendered
mutiny a crime punishable by death without bothering to define it.3 4  It
is clear by the definitive terms of Article 94 that mutiny under the U.C.M.J.
has three essential elements: intent, coupled with either or both of a
refusal to obey orders or to do one's duty and violence or disturbance.
Intent is the most essential element of mutiny. The necessary intent must
be an intent to usurp or override lawful military authority.35  The early
writers did not consider intent, as such, to be the paramount element of
mutiny. Lieutenant O'Brien considered mutiny to be a crime "com-
pleted by a combined or simultaneous resistance, whether active or passive,
to lawful military authority."3 6 Although the elements of violence or pas-
sive refusal are present, no intent is mentioned. Nor is Lieutenant 0'-
Brien unsupported in his views. General Davis, professor of military law
at West Point, described mutiny as "... a revolt against, or in forcible
22. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 342.
23. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 343.
24. DAvis, supra note 15, at 343.
25. DAvis, supra note 15, at 343.
26. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 343.
27. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 343.
28. Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, tit. XIV, 2 Stat. 359.
29. Act of December 1, 1873, ch. 5, tit. XIV, 18 Stat. 337.
30. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 2, § 1, 41 Stat. 787.
31. U.C.M.J. arts. 1-140, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
32. U.C.M.J. art. 94(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1) (1964).
33. U.C.M.J. art. 94(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1) (1964).
34. See, e.g., Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 2, § 3, 41 Stat. 801.
35. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
173(a) (1968).
36. O'BRIEN, TREATISE ON AMERICAN MILITARY LAW 70 (1846).
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resistance or opposition to, constituted military authority. '8 7 However,
other writers observed mutiny as a crime characterized and differen-
tiated from others by its intent. Most notable of these was Colonel Win-
throp, who wrote of mutiny:
It is the intent which distinguishes it from the other offenses with which, to the em-
barrassment of the student, it has been confused both in treatise and General Or-
ders.38
Colonel Winthrop, and later Colonel Dudley, pointed out that mutiny,
especially with regard to the element of intent, was not defined in the Ar-
ticles of War: Such definition came from the courts.39
Mutiny on ships of the merchant fleet was a federal court matter, and
the courts-martial most probably looked to federal cases to determine
whether mutiny had occurred as charged. The Supreme Court had de-
fined mutiny in terms of maritime law in the case of United States v.
Kelly. 40 In that case the Court stated:
The offence [sic] consists in the endeavour [sic] of the crew of a vessel, or any one
or more of them, to overthrow the legitimate authority of her commander, with in-
tent to remove him from his command, or against his will to take possession of the
vessel by assuming the government and navigation of her, or by transferring their
obedience from the lawful commander to some other person. 41
Thereafter, the federal district court in Thompson v. The Stacey Clarke42
further defined mutiny as
attempts to usurp the command from the master, or to deprive him of it for any
purpose by violence or in resisting him in the free and lawful exercise of his au-
thority; the overthrowing of the legal authority of the master, with an intent to re-
move him against his will. 43
Note that both statements define mutiny in terms of violence or resistance
to lawful authority, coupled with the intent to remove the master from his
position of authority. This is quite similar to the definition of mutiny con-
tained in the U.C.M.J., especially as to the element of intent.
In order to establish that a mutiny has been committed, it is necessary
to prove that the intent to usurp or override lawful military authority
existed at the time the accused committed the act of violence or resistance. 44
37. DAVIs, supra note 15, at 392.
38. WINTHROP, supra note 12, at 578.
39. DUDLEY, MILITARY LAW 348 (1907); supra note 12, at 578.
40. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 184 (1826).
41. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
42. 54 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Ala. 1892).
43. Id. at 534. Accord, Hamilton v. United States, 268 F. 15 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 645 (1920). Compare with United States v. Huff, 13 F. Supp. 630
(W.D. Tenn. 1882) and United States v. Bladen, 24 F. Cas. 1161 (No. 14,606)
(D. Pa. 1816). See 18 U.S.C. § 2193 (1964).
44. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 35.
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While the definition of the crime is more clear under the present code than
at any time before, it still fails succinctly to define intent to usurp or
override authority. This problem is left to the courts-martial. Although
the lack of precise definition poses no gargantuan problem in the case of
actual violence, e.g., the seizing of a headquarters building (because the
act itself shows an intent to usurp lawful authority), "[t]he intent may be
declared in words, inferred from acts done, or inferred from the surround-
ing circumstances." '4 5 It is from this that the problem arises. Since intent
must be inferred in many cases, if the act itself is not lucid in its presen-
tation of the element, it must be declared or shown by the circumstances.
In the case of passive or non-violent mutiny, absent declaration of intent,
it is often difficult to determine whether the act shows intent to override
authority or merely to resist it.
The intent to override lawful military authority, while essential to the
offense,46 does not constitute mutiny absent some type of overt act, since
intent is merely a form of thought. Mutiny has been called ". . . a crime
of the greatest magnitude. . . , the most heinous known to military law."
'47
It might therefore be expected that a crime which is described as heinous
would normally require a serious act in furtherance of the intent to commit
that crime. So it is with the crime of mutiny, 48 and what act could be more
serious than an act of violence? Violent acts being of the type which can
create a mutiny, 49 an examination of mutinous incidents involving violent
acts is appropriate.
One of the first mutiny cases decided by the United States Court of
Military Appeals was United States v. O'Briski.50 In that case, the acts
in question were exhortation not to work, refusal to work, and rioting. The
the court-martial instruction was that the elements of mutiny were
that the accused created violence or a disturbance, or that he refused in concert
with another person or persons to obey orders or otherwise do his duty and . . . that
he did so with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority.51
This seems innocuous at first glance, but the crime of mutiny requires that
the intent be present concurrent with the act. However, the court held that
even though this separation of instruction was error, the total instruction de-
fined the crime. 52 It becomes immediately evident that intent is the es-
sential element.
45. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 35.
46. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
47. O'BRIEN, supra note 36.
48. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
49. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
50. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 8 C.M.R. 161 (1953).
51. Id. at 363, 8 C.M.R. at 163.
52. Id.
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In the case of a violent mutiny, however, it is not difficult to show the
presence of intent by the act itself. In another incident, 53 the court ex-
amined the situation of a riot which forced guards away from the stockade
and led to a revolt in which stockade facilities were destroyed. Here, the
court stated that when intent is shown to be present in one acting to create
violence, he is guilty of mutiny. 54 Furthermore, the court pointed out that
intent may be shown to exist by the circumstances when no other reason is
given for the violence than that of overthrowing lawful military authority.55
Violent mutiny can be shown to exist from many different types of acts.
It may be shown from shattering windows, throwing rocks, ripping plumb-
ing fixtures out of walls, tearing off doors, and starting fires,56 or from
riot.57 In other cases, violent mutiny consisted of threatening an officer
with a pistol,58 threatening other prisoners with bodily harm if they
marched properly after a shakedown by prison guards,59 or theatening beat-
ing with bunk posts to any prisoner who refused to join in a work stop-
page.6 0 Even in these cases, although the act was sufficient to prove in-
tent, the accused were not always found guilty, usually on the grounds of
improper instructions.
The violent act must tend to show an intent to usurp or override
authority; it is not enough to show simply that the act was committed. In
United States v. Bachman,6" the court found that the mere handing of
steel bed adapters to other prisoners without some act or declaration show-
ing intent was insufficient to prove the intent necessary to sustain a charge
of solicitation to mutiny.0 2 The court pointed out that a disruptive act
alone would not sustain the charge, nor would it show intent if not di-
rected to the purpose to which the intent requisite to mutiny must be di-
rected, i.e., the usurpation of authority.
It must also be noted that although the acts committed by defendants
are such that they might show intent to override lawful military authority, it
is equally possible to infer from them an intent merely to defy authority.
53. United States v. Duggan, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 396, 15 C.M.R. 396 (1954), and its
companion case, United States v. Mendiola, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 403, 15 C.M.R. 403
(1954).
54. United States v. Duggan, supra note 53, at 397-98, 15 C.M.R. at 398.
55. United States v. Duggan, supra note 53, at 402, 15 C.M.R. at 402.
56. United States v. Duggan, supra note 53; United States v. Mendiola, supra
note 53.
57. Supra note 50.
58. United States v. Watson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 557, 16 C.M.R. 131 (1954).
59. United States v. Morris, 21 C.M.R. 535 (1956).
60. United States v. Turner, 10 C.M.R. 394 (1953).
61. 20 C.M.R. 700 (1956).
62. id. at 702-703.
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Without devoting any greater discussion to the point, virtually all military
law charges contain what are known as lesser included offenses, elements
of which are contained in the major charges: For example, elements of
aggravated battery are included in the charge of murder. This has been con-
strued as raising a reasonable hypothesis of innocence of the major charge,
and if the major charge cannot be proven conclusively, the appellate
court must affirm only the lesser offense as to which there is no reasonable
hypothesis of innocence, or if no lesser offense is reasonably charged,
they must dismiss. 63 The effect of this is that some cases of violent mutiny
have been reversed simply because of procedural errors in instruction as
to lesser included offenses, even though the facts tended to show intent to
usurp lawful military authority.6 4
Facts constituting violence often tend to show intent necessary to sustain
a conviction for mutiny. But other facts in the same transaction may over-
come the showing of intent. In United States v. Anderson,65 a major riot
took place over a period of two and one-half days. Although several of
the defendants were charged with mutiny as a result of their violent acts
of seizing the stockade, this charge was not sustained because the facts
showed that these same prisoners aided stockade authorities in quieting
down the tumult.66 When viewing a situation of violence, it must be re-
membered that the entire transaction must be considered, because the in-
tent to commit a mutinous act may be shown to be lacking rather than
existing.
Violent mutiny is by far the type of mutiny which is most familiarly com-
prehended by the law and public. From times even beyond H.M.S.
Bounty, the violent mutiny has been present in military law. There is, how-
ever, a second type of mutiny defined in the U.C.M.J. This is the non-vio-
lent, or resistance type of mutiny, defined as refusal ". . . in concert with
any other person or persons, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty.
. ."6 This type of mutiny is more difficult to prove, since by its very
nature the acts in question could show intent either to defy military author-
ity or to usurp it, and, therefore, it requires an even more stringent proof
of intent than the violent mutiny.
One of the earliest cases arising on a charge of non-violent mutiny was
United States v. Verdone.68 In Verdone, a group of prisoners were trans-
63. United States v. O'Neal, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 138, 2 C.M.R. 144 (1952).
64. United States v. Grady, 13 C.M.R. 357 (1953).
65. 4 C.M.R. 178 (1951).
66. Id. at 181-82.
67. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
68. 13 C.M.R. 468 (1953).
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ferred from the Fort Dix Stockade to a training company, there to complete
basic training. The prisoners, individually and as a group, refused to
train. After being given a direct order to do close order drill, they again
refused, and were returned to the stockade. There was no violent act on
the part of the prisoners, not even so much as shouting, 69 yet they were con-
victed of mutiny. The Court of Military Review reversed as to the mutiny
charge on the grounds that there was no instruction on the lesser included
offense of disobedience of a lawful order. 70 As in many mutiny cases,
this court likewise reversed for failure to instruct properly. 7 ' The court did
not consider the main point: whether or not mutiny had been committed.
They merely stated that ". . . only one order was given. . . and. . . each
accused willfully disobeyed the order. The evidence outlined . . . clearly
supports that view and places in issue the offense of willful disobedience
as distinct from mutiny."' 72 The court then considered the instructional
error and did not further discuss non-violent mutiny. This case would ap-
pear to offer an excellent opportunity to clarify the elements necessary to
prove mutiny rather than a lesser offense, but the court preferred to stand
on the procedural question.
One year later, however in United States v. Duggan,73 the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals discussed the elements and types of mutiny more concisely.
There the court pointed out that there are two types of mutiny, not differ-
ing in degree, but only on technical bases. Mutiny by violence may be
committed by one or more persons, alone or in concert with others, with
the intent to override or usurp lawful military authority. The court stated
that non-violent mutiny is proved by collective insubordination, neces-
sarily implying acts or refusals by two or more persons in concert, plus
the requisite intent. The intent, stated the court, need not be precon-
ceived.74
What the court had stated was basically a reiteration of the Manual for
Courts-Martial (hereinafter referred to as M.C.M.) para. 173(a). 75 How-
ever, M.C.M. para. 173(a), while serving as an important guideline to
military, is neither statute nor case law. It is a guide for counsel, especially
trial counsel, and carries only as much weight as would similar guidelines.
By its decision in Duggan, the court has given much greater effect to this
69. Id.
70. Id. at 471.
71. Cf. supra note 64, at 359.
72. Supra note 68, at 470.
73. United States v. Duggan, supra note 53.
74. United States v. Duggan, supra note 53, at 398; 15 C.M.R. at 398.
75. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 35.
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definition of mutiny. But M.C.M. para. 173(a) and Duggan still do not
go to the question of intent in non-violent mutiny cases. Is the intent re-
quired to establish mutiny also to be shared with the co-actors who of neces-
sity must participate in the act? Or is it sufficient that the accused alone
have the intent to usurp lawful military authority, regardless of the intent
of the other participants? These questions were left unanswered.
Finally, in 1961, the Court of Military Appeals again took up the ques-
tion of the necessary elements of the offense of mutiny with reference to the
non-violent type. In United States v. Woolbright,76 several prisoners were
on a work detail enlarging a golf course sand trap in cold, rainy weather.
Some of the prisoners were not working, and one of these lit a cigarette. He
was told to put it out. At this point the accused stuck his pick into the
ground, took out a cigarette and announced that he was not afraid to
smoke. He further stated that he would use the pick on anyone who at-
tempted to stop him. He lit his cigarette and refused to put it out. Other
prisoners follow suit and all refused to work. The accused did not urge
others not to work, and in fact was quiet and passive after leaving the sand
trap, although other orders were refused in the events that followed. He
was convicted of mutiny. 77 It should be noted that the accused and the
other prisoners involved in the alleged mutiny in Woolbright committed
separate acts of refusal to obey different orders or to do their duty. This
factor greatly distinguishes Woolbright from the case about which this note
is concerned, in which all the prisoners participated in the same act. 78
However, an even more critical fact distinguishes Woolbright from the
object case. Woolbright, after announcing that he was going to defy the
order against smoking, threatened to use his pick on anyone who tried to
stop him. As has been previously shown, threats of violence either to those
in lawful authority or to those who would otherwise comply with lawful
orders have been considered by the court as the basis of violent mutiny. 79
Yet the decision in Woolbright concerns non-violent mutiny. Apparently,
since it is never discussed in the facts, the prosecution attempted to charge
only the non-violent (refusal to obey orders) type of mutiny, so as to include
all the prisoners involved in the incident. The prosecution thus appeared
to have forced the court to consider an issue which need not have been
raised.
The government contended in Woolbright that mutiny is committed when
the defendant, with intent to override lawful military authority on his own
76. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 450; 31 C.M.R. 36 (1961).
77. Id. at 451-52; 31 C.M.R. at 37-38.
78. United States v. Sood, - C.M.R. - (ACMR 16 June 1970) (CM 420276).
79. See supra notes 58-60.
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part, engages in joint disobedience of a lawful order with the other pri-
soners. It was further contended that there was no need of common intent
by those involved to set aside the military command over them. The Wool-
bright court, citing United States v. Duggan,80 held that, in order for violent
mutiny to exist, there must be both common intent and collective action.81
"This type of mutiny requires concerted action with at least one other per-
son who also shares the accused's intent to usurp or override lawful mili-
tary authority. '8 2 If this can be proved, then the accused are necessarily
guilty of mutiny.
But in Woolbright there was a "... sequence of separate disobedi-
ences by individual prisoners rather than concert of action and joint intent
to usurp or override. . . authority."83 There was certainly no showing of
an intent to usurp authority. The court stated that there was not even
enough evidence presented in this case to find a technical mutiny, as
the government claimed. What occurred was a series of actions by dif-
ferent persons lacking a common intent . 4
Non-violent mutiny, under the Woolbright definition, requires a common
action and a common intent. In that case the charge failed as to both
elements. Each accused prisoner did a different act of disobedience at a
different time. Aside from Woolbright's threat, there was no more in-
tent shown by the actions of the prisoners than that to defy the orders of the
guard as to cigarette smoking, orders which the evidence shows had not
been stringently enforced before that time. This is not the "stuff" that
non-violent mutiny is made of; it is "a specialized type of conspiracy in
which the co-actors must share a common purpose. There must be con-
cert of action and concert of intent. ' 85 Both elements had failed.
A question is raised as to what remains to be said about non-violent mu-
tiny. Duggan gave a preliminary definition, albeit in a case where the ac-
tion spoke more of violent mutiny, and resulted in a conviction for riot.
Woolbright clarified the definition, pointing out that intent, as well as
action, must be shared. In that case also, the facts pointed more to a
violent mutiny, if any at all. The object case differs from these in that, for
the first time, the court was squarely presented with a case in which
there was concerted action in a mutiny charge: All the actors joined
80. United States v. Duggan, supra note 53; United States v. Mendiola, supra
note 53.
81. Supra note 76, at 452, 31 C.M.R. at 38.
82. Supra note 76, at 453, 31 C.M.R. at 39.
83. Supra note 76, at 453, 31 C.M.R. at 39.
84. Supra note 76, at 452, 31 C.M.R. at 39.
85. Supra note 76, at 453, 31 C.M.R. at 39.
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in the same act. If there was the requisite intent, it would logically
follow that mutiny had been proved.
In United States v. Sood8 6 the facts show that the defendants joined
in doing the same act at the same time. Together, the group of twenty-
seven men broke formation; together, they sat down outside the stockade
building; together, they refused to move into it on Captain Lamont's order.
There were no violent acts by any one of the group, nor were there even
any threats of violence to the guards or to other prisoners. If there was to
be any non-violent mutiny conviction under Article 94,87 it would happen
under facts such as these. Unlike Duggan and Woolbright, in which the
court's opinion was either dictum or exceedingly close thereto, Sood's defi-
nition would be truly dispositive of the issues. Moreover, in Sood the
court characterized the intent which may be inferred from acts such as oc-
curred at the Presidio.
The appeal in Sood alleged eighteen assignments of error. 8 The first
of these considered by the court was the contention of instructional error.
It is in the instructions that the definition of non-violent mutiny is dis-
cussed. The specific error claimed was that there was no instruction given
requiring a finding that the appellant's intent must be shared.
The trial judge gave instruction to the effect that, to find the appellant
guilty of mutiny, the fact-finders must decide that the accused acted in a
concert of action with at least one other person. Furthermore, they must
find that the accused acted with the intent to override lawful military
authority. Another instruction stated that the term "in concert with"
meant ". . . together with another person or persons in accordance with a
common intent, design or plan .... ,,89 The trial judge then admonished
the court members that a mere joint disobedience of orders without intent
to override authority is not of itself mutiny.90
Thus, it appears that no mention was made in the instructions of the re-
quisite shared intent of the Woolbright definition of non-violent mutiny.
The government contended that the proof of intent in the record, when
taken together with the instructional framework, fairly conveyed an in-
struction on shared intent. 91 To this contention, the court retorted that the
correctness of the instructions may not be measured by the quantum of
proof of the required intent. 92 The result is that shared intent is so im-
86. Supra note 78.
87. U.C.M.J. art. 94, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
88. Supra note 78.
89. Supra note 78.
90. Supra note 78.
91. Supra note 78.
92. Supra note 78.
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portant an element that it must be specifically treated in the instructions.
Without instruction on that element, the factfinders could forseeably find
mutiny if the facts of a non-violent mutiny situation showed the requisite
intent only on the part of one accused.
The government did not follow the Woolbright decision in the Sood case.
Perhaps, as has been contended herein Woodbright was not followed be-
cause it was felt to be distinguishable on its facts. Since in Woolbright
the court felt there was no concert of action or intent, the government may
have interpreted that decision as meaning that, in a case where there was
the requisite concert of action, the shared intent would be inferred from
the acts.
The court, however, adopted the Duggan-Woolbright definitions of mu-
tiny, pointing out that both collective action and collective intent to over-
ride lawful military authority must be pleaded and proved. "A persis-
tent refusal in concert to obey lawful orders coupled with a specific
concerted intent . . . constitut[es] ...mutiny."9 If this shared intent
were not the requirement, then any joint disobedience of orders or a joint
refusal to do duty would be mutiny. Yet such a rule would be contrary
to Woolbright and even to the trial judge's instructions. In this case, the
instruction puts emphasis on a collective intent to disobey orders rather
than to override; and this is not the intent which controls in a charge of
mutiny.
The lack of instruction on this most essential element of the offense of
mutiny creates several problems. It first of all renders a finding of guilt
as to mutiny impermissible. Secondly, because of this error in instruction,
an instruction that the deeds of co-actors were admissible to prove intent
on the part of the appellant was also inadmissible as prejudicial error.
The requisite shared intent cannot be imputed in the absence of an in-
struction on shared intent coupled with proof that it indeed existed. The
instructional errors here went so deeply to the foundation of the issue that
they required reversal.94
From a definitional standpoint, non-violent mutiny requires, as was
stated in Duggan and Woolbright, a collective action and a shared intent.
Even if the requisite collective, concerted action is shown by the facts, this
alone will not impute the requisite shared intent. Furthermore, even if
there is a collective intent to defy lawful military authority, the proof of this
intent coupled with collective or concerted action on the part of the accused
is not sufficient to infer an intent to override lawful military authority.
93. Supra note 78.
94. Supra note 78.
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In Sood, the court clarified the elements of the offense of non-violent
mutiny to a greater degree than in either Woolbright or Duggan, and did
so in a factual situation which cannot be said to be anything other than
non-violent.
In additon to solidifying the definition of non-violent mutiny in its
treatment of instructional error, the court in Sood also examined the
factual evidence. 95 As has been shown previously, it seldom ever occurs
that a mutinous intent is declared by an accused; thus the prosecution is
forced to show that the necessary intent can be inferred from the actions
of the accused or from the circumstances, as required under M.C.M. para.
173(a). The court in Sood undertook to examine the incidents occurring at
the Presidio Stockade to determine whether an intent to override lawful
military authority could be shown by such acts.96
In a situation concerning non-violent mutiny, the intent element is the
same as that required in a violent mutiny. There is little difficulty in
showing that intent to override lawful military authority existed when facts
show that the accused beat guards in a stockade and forced them to re-
treat, leaving the prisoners in possession and command of the stockade.97
In such a situation, it is obvious that the authority of the commander of the
stockade has been usurped, for he can no longer exercise his lawful au-
thority over anyone in the stockade. In the absence of violent acts, this
intent is harder, if not impossible, to prove.
When the acts of those charged with mutiny consist solely of refusal to
do their duty or to obey orders, can that be enough to show the required in-
tent? It would seem that to override or usurp authority, the acts of the
accused would of necessity be coupled with some more positive refusal
to obey. Thus, were the accused to give orders of his own and the others in
volved followed him, or if all the accused refused to do their duty in such
circumstances that would render the commander powerless to control them,
the intent to override or usurp lawful military authority could very likely
be shown, even though no accused committed violence. However, the
circumstances necessary for such a hypothetical happening would un-
doubtedly be such that all those under a given commander joined in con-
cert to refuse to do their lawful duty. If the commander were able to ex-
95. Supra note 78. Appellate courts in the military court system are charged
with examination of cases on appeal both as to law and fact to determine the cor-
rectness of a conviction. U.C.M.J. art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964). Thus the
court in Sood examined the factual evidence to see whether the facts justified a
conviction for non-violent mutiny.
96. Brief for Appellant at 17, United States v. Rowland, - C.M.R. - (ACMR
30 June 1970) (CM 421750).
97. Supra note 64; supra note 65.
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ercise his governance over some of his troops, then it would seem that the
others might only be defying authority rather than usurping it.
In Sood and the other Presidio mutiny cases, the facts show that the ac-
cused prisoners refused to obey one order: the order to return to the main
stockade building. Other than this specific act, all that the prisoners did
was to present a list of grievances to the stockade commander, and ask to
be heard by the base commander, the inspector general, and the press
concerning conditions in the prison compound. Captain Lamont, the of-
ficer-in-charge, still controlled the guards, the military police, and all the
prisoners other than the 27 who broke formation.9 8
In looking upon this situation, the court found the evidence to be lack-
ing to establish a mutiny by reason of a lack of the requisite intent.
The words and deeds of the appellant and his co-actors do not evince, either singu-
larly or collectively, an intention to usurp or override military authority. Rather, the
common thread of evidence throughout this entire voluminous record demonstrates
an intention to implore and invoke the very military authority which they are charged
with seeking to override.99
The court again pointed out that there clearly was a collective intent to defy
authority. The prisoners had most probably felt than in order to have con-
ditions changed they would have to avoid the channels of authority, since
these had not been successful in the past. But this collective intent to
defy authority is much less than the intent to usurp or override lawful mili-
tary authority. "The former is not shorthand for the latter."' 00
The court also pointed out that there was no other involvement by the
accused in addition to membership in the group, nor any record that any
of the accused attempted to usurp Captain Lamont's authority, although
they did defy it. No one overtly resisted the military police, nor did
anyone supplant the authority of the commander: He alone gave orders,
and no one in the group attempted to do more than to encourage the
others to be non-violent. There was no specific leader of the group, and no
one told the others what they were to do. 101 "The factual recital clearly
shows that Captain Lamont had absolute and unfettered control over the
incidents of his command although his specific orders to the inmates were
disobeyed."' 02
Thus, the court in Sood denies credence to the contention that a collect-
98. Supra note 96.
99. Supra note 78. (emphasis added)
100. Supra note 78.
101. Prisoner Pawlowski, who read the list of grievances, was not among the
appellants in any of the seven cases. It may be that he was the prisoner who left
the original group when fire trucks arrived. Supra note 96, at 23.
102. Supra note 78.
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ive defiance of authority of lower command levels in order to bring griev-
ances to them and their superiors does not constitute mutiny. It cannot be
mutiny, because it seeks to use the channels of authority above their local
command to press complaints, clearly the antithesis of the intent to over-
ride that authority.
What then are the ramifications of Sood; what will its impact be on mili-
tary law? The foremost effect of Sood is its clarification of the definition
of non-violent mutiny. It points out that both collective action and con-
certed intent are required to prove non-violent mutiny, and in this as-
pect it reiterates prior decisions. But Sood goes one step farther because,
unlike the earlier decisions, there was clear-cut collective action of a
purely non-violent type. The distinction is not merely academic. Sood
shows that intent is the paramount requirement in proving non-violent mu-
tiny, and points out that factual situations such as those present there can-
not be used to impute such intent.
But there are other aspects to the Sood decision. By its narrowing
of the types of situations from which intent to override lawful military au-
thrity may be inferred, it would appear that non-violent mutiny in its
pristine sense may be more than difficult to prove; it may be impossible, ab-
sent a clear-cut declaration by the accused. Sood also provides a
means, albeit difficult and frought with penalty, for the stockade prisoner
to improve his lot when appeals to ordinary channels have failed, because
Sood provides an outlet through which the prisoner can speak without fear
of capital punishment. While this may be a risky and rather last-ditch
manner of presenting grievances, such a route may be the only way re-
maining. What far-reaching effects Sood will have on further cases charg-
ing non-violent mutiny remains to be seen, but it may be that the Presidio
mutiny cases will sound the death knell for the charge of non-violent mu-
tiny.
Terrence J. Benshoof
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